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THE JOB.

2.

THERE WAS NO FINDING
WAS ONE REQUIRED.

3.
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ON THE MATTER OF DAMAGES NOR

DETAILS OF ARGUMENT
1
THE BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF MISSTATES THE RECORD REGARDING
FURNISHING OF INVOICES AND COMPLETION OF THE JOB
Plaintiff's Brief at page 17 states that at
trial

Plaintiff

requested

had

because

not

the

job

received
was

all

not

of

the time of
the

totally

invoices
completed.

Whereas, the

fact of the matter is that at the time of trial

the job

been

had

inspection.

All of

completed

and

there

had

been

a final

the final invoices recently issued were

timely mailed to counsel for Plaintiff at his former address.
The invoices

arrived at

his new address on the first day of

the trial and he had them with him the morning

of the second

day of the trial.
The statement

in Plaintiff's Brief that the job had not

been completed at the time of trial does

not conform

to the

facts.

The job had been completed and there had been a final

inspection.

There may have been left punch list items.

TR Vol. I, page 3:
"...The Court: Mr. Stark?
Mr. Stark:
Your Honor, the —
the job has been
completed to the extent that there's been
a final inspection, and there may b e —
may be a punch list, but all of the
invoices with respect to the electrical
materials portion of it are in.
I received copies and mailed copies to
counsel.
He says he's changed his
address in the last about twenty days.
Mr. Jones:
About three weeks. Mr.
Stark:
Or something like that. We've
also sent to him an analysis of -- an upto-date analysis of what the claim for
damages is based on the original bid and
based on the invoices that we have now
received from
Whitehead Electric and
Electrical Wholesale.
I've got copies here for him and we did
mail copies and I cannot account for his
statement that he hasn't received them
because they were placed in the mail to
him."

THERE WAS NO FINDING ON THE MATTER OF
DAMAGES NOR WAS ONE REQUIRED
Plaintiff's

Brief

claims

that Defendant did not carry

his burden of proof with respect to damages.

In

ruling

for action, the

of

the

trial

court

of

-2-

no

cause

view of the

question of damages was not reached by the
pointed out

in Defendant's

Judge although as

Brief there is ample evidence in

the record to sustain such an award.
3
THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT ACCEPTED
PLAINTIFF'S LOW PRICE AND THAT THERE WAS
DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
Plaintiff's 3rief at item 9, pages 6 and 7, and
10 states

that there

was no

at page

acceptance by Plaintiff of the

first bid of Defendant.
Whereas, the Transcript, Vol. I at page 61 indicates the
following:
"Q. When you got this price from Graybar
at, you say about 9:30 on the 20th of
July, in the morning, who did you talk
with? A. Kerry Pusey. Q. He gave you
that figure?
A. Yes. Q. Did you have
any further discussion with respect to
that figure?
A.
Did I what? Q. Did
you have any further discussion with him
with respect to that figure? A. I told
him I was going to use it and was it all
right and he said yes. Q. Okay."
The trial judge's ruling is as follows (TR Vol II, pages
142 and 43):
"I think there is a distinction between
what's moral and what's legal, and it
seems to me that if somebody calls up and
says, we'll do it for a certain price,
that they should — they should do it for
a certain price.
-3-

From the standpoint of the law, there is
no -- there is obviously no contract
because a contract requires offer and
acceptance and there's no
offer, or
there's no acceptance.
A bid is in the
nature of an offer, and there's actually
no acceptance of that offer until after- after the contract is accepted by the
general or the general receives the bid
and then accepts the subcontract and so
on.
And under the law of contracts, any time
a party to a contract wants to withdraw,
they have a right to withdraw an offer
any time prior to acceptance. That's—
I think that's where the doctrine of
Promissory Estoppel
comes
into play
because of situations like this. It's
not
the
classic
offer/acceptance
situation.
Under Promissory Estoppel if somebody
submits a bid relying upon that bid, the
Court's going to come along later and
say, well, we're — we're going to estop
the — the subcontractor from denying the
fact that they have —
that they have
made a bid at a particular figure and
that the contractor relied upon that bid.
The thing that's lacking in this case, of
course, is the reliance. When — when
Graybar contacted Mr. Lewis and indicated
to him that it was a mistake and that
they could not go with the lower bid,
when he submitted his bid then he wasn't
relying upon that —
there wasn't the
detrimental
reliance
that
would be
normally
required
in
a
Promissory
Estoppel situation.
He

submitted

his

bid based upon a hope
-4-

that he would be able to -- to get the
material for the lower price, but in this
case it appears to be a vain hope.
So
Promissory Estoppel will fail based on
the fact that there wasn't a reliance
upon the
Graybar figure, that's the
$213,400. So the Court reluctantly finds
no cause on the second action or the
second cause of action."
At what point in time would there have

been detrimental

reliance?
If Defendant

had left his office for the bid depository

or had filed his bid at the depository prior to notice of the
claimed error, there would have been detrimental reliance.
On the

other hand,

if Defendant had received notice of

the claimed error early enough to have revised
and still

submit on

his bid forms

bime at the depository, there would not

have been detrimental reliance.
However, where, as in this case, Defendant did
sufficient time

to change

not have

his bid forms after notice of the

claimed error and still submit on time, there was detrimental
reliance.
Plaintiff's Brief

speculated what

done regarding changing his bid.
is that

Defendant accepted

on it in working up his

bid

Defendant could have

However, the solid evidence

Plaintiff's low price and relied
forms.

-5-

The
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